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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No.  08-3541& 09-1153
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                      
v.
RYAN JAMES CRAIG,
                        Appellant.
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No.  06-cr-00219-001)
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 29, 2009
Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: November 27, 2009)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
2HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Ryan Craig appeals the judgment of the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania (District Court) granting the Government’s request to divert a
portion of his seized property to victims in an unrelated federal criminal judgment entered
by the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island in 2003 (Rhode Island
Court).  For the reasons that follow, we will vacate and remand.
I.
Because we write for the parties, we recount only those facts necessary to our
decision.
In 2007, a jury convicted Craig of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. 
The District Court sentenced Craig to 71 months imprisonment and ordered him to pay
restitution to his victims in the amount of $12,411.00, as well as a special assessment of
$300.00.  Because the United States Attorney for the Middle District of Pennsylvania had
previously seized $16,432.00 from Craig, it sought to satisfy the restitution order from
those funds.  Craig conceded that the District Court could apply $12,711.00 of the seized
funds to satisfy the restitution order and special assessment, but requested the return of
the remaining $3,631.00 pursuant to Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.  The Government opposed Craig’s motion, arguing that the balance of the
seized funds should be used to pay the unsatisfied restitution order entered by the Rhode
Island Court.
 Craig concedes that he cannot challenge the District Court’s order granting the1
Government’s request regarding the $12,711.00 on appeal because he waived that
argument in the District Court.
3
On July 28, 2008, the District Court granted the Government’s request regarding
the $12,711.00, but addressed neither Craig’s motion for return of property nor the
Government’s request regarding restitution for the Rhode Island victims.   On December1
30, 2008, the District Court denied Craig’s motion for return of property and ordered the
Government to remit the balance of $3,631.00 to the Clerk of the Rhode Island Court. 
Craig appeals the December 30 order and we have jurisdiction to consider his appeal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
Title 18, Section 3556 authorizes district courts to order restitution in criminal
cases: “[t]he court, in imposing a sentence on a defendant who has been found guilty of
an offense . . . may order restitution in accordance with section 3663.”  Section 3663
further provides: “[t]he court, when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense under
this title [of which wire fraud is included] . . . may order . . . that the defendant make
restitution to any victim of such offense, or if the victim is deceased, to the victim’s
estate.  The court may also order, if agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement,
restitution to persons other than the victim of the offense.”  18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A)
(emphasis added).  Accordingly, restitution may only be paid to an individual if one of
two conditions is met: (1) the individual is a “victim” in the present case; or (2) the
4restitution payment was agreed to in a plea agreement.  Because Craig did not enter into a
plea agreement in this case, we need consider only the first condition in assessing whether
the District Court’s order directing payment to the Rhode Island victims was proper.
Section 3663 defines “victim” as “a person directly and proximately harmed as a
result of the commission of an offense for which restitution may be ordered including, in
the case of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of
criminal activity, any person directly harmed by the defendant’s criminal conduct in the
course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.”  18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2).  Under this
definition, the individuals injured as a result of Craig’s 2003 conviction for wire fraud in
the District of Rhode Island do not qualify as “victims” because they were not “directly
and proximately harmed” as a result of Craig’s present offense.  Their injuries were
confined to the 2003 crime for which Craig was sentenced to 27 months imprisonment
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $58,000.00.  The fact that Craig has not
yet fulfilled that restitutionary obligation does not grant the District Court authority to
offer restitution to those individuals in this case.
Furthermore, the Government itself cannot claim to be a victim in either the
present case or the Rhode Island case.  The Government argues that the District Court
was authorized to apply the seized funds because, as the District Court duly noted, an
order of restitution made pursuant to § 3663—as was made in Rhode Island—is “a lien in
favor of the United States on all property and rights to property of the person fined.”  18
5U.S.C. § 3613(c).  However, that argument improperly conflates the Government’s
entitlement to the funds with the District Court’s authority to divert those funds in this
case.  Though we have previously held that a governmental body may be considered a
“victim” under § 3663, see United States v. Hand, 863 F.2d 1100, 1103 (3d Cir. 1988)
(holding that the United States Attorney’s office was entitled to restitution for time and
resources wasted in light of the defendant’s impermissible conduct as a juror at trial), the
Government does not assert that any governmental body was harmed by Craig’s actions. 
Rather, the Government is attempting to use its position as a common party—the
prosecution—in both the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania cases as a means to compensate
a private third party.  This is not what § 3663 contemplates.
The Government also argues that the District Court was authorized to transfer the
seized funds to the Rhode Island victims because it assumed jurisdiction over Craig’s
supervised release for his sentence on the 2003 crime.  The Government argues that “[b]y
accepting transfer of jurisdiction over Craig’s supervised release, the district court had the
authority to enforce the provision pertaining to payment of restitution.”  We disagree
because the duty to oversee Craig’s supervised release does not confer upon the District
Court any authority to direct restitution in the Rhode Island case.  Section 3663 authorizes
a judgment of restitution at the time of sentencing, but not thereafter.  See United States v.
Sasnett, 925 F.2d 392, 399 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A) (“[t]he
court, when sentencing a defendant . . .)).  The fact that the District Court is empowered
6to conduct a supervised release revocation hearing does not change our analysis. 
Accordingly, the Rhode Island victims could only receive an order of restitution when
Craig was sentenced in 2003.
In sum, we hold that the District Court lacked the statutory authority to order the
transfer of seized funds to the Rhode Island Court for the purpose of facilitating the
payment of restitution in an unrelated case.  This does not mean, however, that the
victims in the Rhode Island case are precluded from seeking to garnish or attach the
seized funds or otherwise pursue collection of what is owed to them through any lawful
means that may be available to them.
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment of the District Court and
remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
